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Abstract
Conventional wisdom tells us that with no market failure and local
non-satiation of preferences, the core is at least as large as the collection
of competitive equilibrium allocations. We con￿rm this for a standard
model featuring land. Next we consider the public land ownership
version of the model. If the role of land ownership and rent distribution
is assumed by a government that ploughs back rent (at least in excess of
its agricultural value) to its citizens, the equilibrium remains e¢ cient,
but no longer need be in the core.
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11 Introduction
Consider a multi-commodity generalization of the Alonso (1964) model. The
economy has land, the interval [0;1), where the origin is the central business
district or CBD. Each consumer must commute to the CBD to work or pick
up their endowment of consumption commodity. Only one consumer can be
adjacent to the CBD. If his parcel is [0;s), then the next consumer incurs
transport cost ts, where t 2 R+ is the commuting input per unit distance
from the CBD in terms of consumption good, as measured from the front of
a person￿ s parcel. The other consumers incur even greater commuting costs.
Traders must use intervals of land. As Berliant and Fujita (1992) have shown,
any equilibrium allocation is e¢ cient.1 But what about the possibility of
improving utility by forming a coalition? The more land consumed by the
agent closest to the CBD, the less land and the less standard commodities
are available for consumption (due to the increased commuting cost of the
consumers farther from the CBD). This observation raises the question if there
is an incentive to exclude one agent. In the next section we demonstrate that
the answer is negative for exchange economies with privately owned land. The
subsequent section will reverse the answer in the public land ownership model,
where a public administration owns land and distributes the rent.2 In fact,
the core is empty for the example we provide. The last section of this note
gives our conclusions.
It is known that models with a continuum of agents, such as variants of
the standard monocentric city model of the New Urban Economics, can have
the property that equilibrium allocations are not e¢ cient and thus are not in
the core; see Berliant, Papageorgiou and Wang (1990). This phenomenon is
entirely due to the fact that there is a continuum of agents in the model. To
avoid this problem, we employ Alonso￿ s model. It features a ￿nite number of
discrete agents.
2 Exchange economies
Consider an exchange economy with l+1 commodities and I consumers indexed
by i with initial endowments comprised of land [￿i;￿i+￿i) and standard com-
1See Berliant and LaFountain (forthcoming) for a graphical treatment.
2The public land ownership model is described in detail in Fujita (1986, section 1.2; 1989,
pp. 60-63) for the model of the New Urban Economics with a continuum of consumers. He
attributes its origins to Solow (1973).
2modities net of transport costs !i￿￿it 2 Rl
+ , where [￿1;￿1+￿1);:::;[￿I;￿I+￿I)
partition3 the world [0;1) and t 2 Rl
+ is the unit commuting input. The
consumers have preference relationships %i that are complete preorders on
R
l+1
+ ; only the quantity of land, e.g. ￿i, is assumed to matter, not the loca-
tion, e.g. ￿i. The quantity of land is taken to be the ￿rst commodity. A
preference relationship is called locally nonsatiated if every neighborhood of
any commodity bundle contains a strictly preferred commodity bundle. For-
mally, %i is locally nonsatiated if for every commodity bundle (￿i;xi) 2 Rl
+





i) ￿i (￿i;xi) and
k (￿0
i;x0
i) ￿ (￿i;xi) k< ￿. For example, the assumption that preferences are
strictly monotonic is stronger. An allocation is a vector of intervals and of
consumption bundles ([zi;zi + si);xi ￿ zit)I
i=1, where for all i, xi ￿ zit. An
allocation ([zi;zi + si);xi ￿ zit)I
i=1 is called feasible if [zi;zi + si)I
i=1 parti-
tion [0;1) (formally [I
i=1[zi;zi + si) = [0;1) and for all i 6= j, 1 ￿ i;j ￿ I,




i=1 !i. A feasible allo-
cation ([zi;zi + si);xi ￿ zit)I
i=1, a measurable price density p : [0;1) ! R+
and a price vector q 2 Rl















￿i p(z)dm(z)+q￿!i. An equilibrium allocation
is the allocation component of an equilibrium.
A coalition is a subset S of f1;:::;Ig. For a coalition S, a coalition realloca-






with xi ￿ zit for all i 2 S, with [z0
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i + si) = [i2S[￿i;￿i + ￿i) and for all i 6= j, 1 ￿ i;j ￿ I,
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i + si) \ [z0
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i2S !i. A feasible allocation
([zi;zi + si);xi ￿ zit)I










it) %i (si;xi ￿zit) (for all i 2 S) and (s0
i;x0
i ￿z0
it) ￿i (si;xi ￿zit) (for
some i 2 S).
If this ￿no coalition reallocation￿condition holds for the grand coalition,
S = f1;:::;Ig, the feasible allocation is e¢ cient. A core allocation is clearly
e¢ cient, but an e¢ cient allocation need not be in the core.
We now adapt Theorem 1 of Debreu and Scarf (1963, attributed to Shapley)
to the generalized Alonso model.
Generalized First Welfare Theorem: If preferences are locally nonsatiated,
3The formal de￿nition of a partition is given below in this paragraph.
3then any equilibrium allocation is in the core.



























i p(z)dm(z) + q ￿ x0
i >
R ￿i+￿i
￿i p(z)dm(z) + q ￿ !i (for some i 2 S).
By local nonsatiation, for all " > 0 there are s"
i and x"
i within distance "
from s0
i and x0
i such that (s"
i;x"
i ￿ z0
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￿i p(z)dm(z) + q ￿ !i (for all
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￿i p(z)dm(z) + q ￿ !i]. But
since ([z0
i + s0

















￿i p(z)dm(z) + q ￿ !i]; that is a
contradiction. Q.E.D.
Remark: One may replace the equality in the material balance conditions
by a strict inequality, both in the de￿nition of equilibrium and of the core, but
then one must assume free disposal to obtain the Generalized First Welfare
Theorem.
Corollaries:
1. An equilibrium allocation is e¢ cient. (Take S = f1;:::;Ig.) This is the
First Welfare Theorem. It motivates the name of the Theorem above.
2. An equilibrium allocation is individually rational. (Take S = fig.)
3 Economies with public land ownership
In many papers4 land is not owned by the consumers, but by an absentee
landlord or a government. In this literature the absentee landlord or the
government is a broker between the farmers and the urban consumers, buying
land at the rent that prevails in agriculture and reselling it at a higher rate
to the consumers. Strictly speaking, this modeling approach is inconsistent
with the premises of neoclassical economics. Why would only the absentee
landlord or the government be able to arbitrage between the farmers and the
4See the surveys of Fujita (1986, 1989).
4urban consumers? Are farmers irrational? We circumvent this problem by
focusing on the so-called closed city model, where land is not purchased from
farmers but instead is owned by the absentee landlord or the government from
the outset.
Our model given in the previous section encompasses the situation with
an absentee landlord without modi￿cation. Simply endow one agent, who
obtains utility from consumption good but not from land, with all the land.
The generalized ￿rst welfare theorem applies. There is no incentive to exclude
a consumer by forming a coalition. True, the central consumer in￿ icts an
enormous opportunity cost on the other consumers, who all incur transport
cost in crossing his parcel. In equilibrium, however, this opportunity cost is
re￿ ected in the rent he pays. By excluding this consumer, the others can no
longer tap his initial wealth endowment. The gain of commuting cost reduction
is o⁄set by the loss of rent he contributes to the other agents, including the
landlord.
The situation with a government is di⁄erent. Index the government agent
by i = 0. It owns all the land, has no preferences, and redistributes rent to the
consumers. What the latter can achieve in terms of land and standard com-
modities, individually or in a coalition, depends not only on the endowment of
the agents involved, but also on rent, hence prices. Whereas in the preceding
section the question of whether an equilibrium is in the core depended only
on the equilibrium allocation, it now also depends on prices and rent titles.
We may minimize this complication of the core concept by following the urban
economic postulate that there is only one non-land or ￿numeraire￿commodity
(l = 1). The price of this commodity is normalized to 1 (q = 1). Indeed, since
we merely want to show that an equilibrium need not be in the core, a simple
example is good enough. The de￿nition of equilibrium is modi￿ed by simple
inclusion of ￿i
R 1
0 p(z)dm(z) in the budget, where (￿i)I
i=1 are the exogenously
given rent shares. A coalition without the government has no land and, there-
fore, no potential to generate a superior assignment to its members if land is
an essential commodity. For a coalition with the government, f0g [ S, where















i2S !i￿Rentleak. Here Rentleak is the rent that leaks
to nonmembers of the coalition. It is well-de￿ned only if we limit coalition re-
allocations to equilibria, with price density pS. This limitation only makes our
result in this section stronger, in the sense we explain at the end of this para-




0 pS(z)dm(z). An equilibrium allocation













(for some i 2 S). Following Fujita (1989, p.60), we presume that rent is evenly
divided among consumers, namely that ￿i = 1=I; i = 1;:::;I. The purpose of
this section is to provide a simple example where an equilibrium allocation is
not in the core, and in fact we will show that the core is empty. This result
will be quite robust, in the following sense. Alternatively one might model
rent shares as coalition dependent, by assuming that consumers who are ex-
cluded from a coalition with the government have no title to the government
rent proceeds. In this case Rentleak is zero, so that the superior coalition re-
allocation we will construct remains applicable (for our non-decreasing utility
function).
With a government, the equilibrium is still e¢ cient. The proof is as
follows. For the grand coalition Rentleak is zero. Begin with an Alonso
economy with a government and public land ownership. Take the equilibrium
allocation we wish to test for e¢ ciency. Use this equilibrium allocation as the
initial endowments (including redistributed rent) for a new exchange economy
with the same I consumers but without the government. The equilibrium
allocation remains an equilibrium allocation in this new exchange economy
without the government but with altered initial endowments. The equilibrium
of the exchange economy is e¢ cient by Corollary 1 to the Generalized First
Welfare Theorem.
Surprisingly, an equilibrium allocation is e¢ cient but need not be in the
core. We will show this in the simplest case, I = f1;2g, with equal endow-
ments 1
8 < ! < 1:319 and equal preferences induced by the good-old utility
function ln(s)+x￿zt, where t ￿ 0:9231. As is well-known, quasi-linearity of
the utility function renders the demand for land independent of the consump-
tion of numeraire for allocations with positive levels of numeraire consumption.
We will suppose without loss of generality for the remainder of the paper that
1 lives closer to the CBD than 2. The contract curve in this model is de￿ned
to be the set of Pareto optima such that 1￿ s marginal rate of substitution is
equal to 2￿ s marginal rate of substitution plus t. This is the analog of the
equality of marginal rates of substitution in the standard general equilibrium
model, and it is also the Muth (1969)-Mills (1972) condition for the Alonso
model.5 The familiar intuition is that at an optimum, if this equality does
5See Berliant and Fujita (1992) and Berliant and LaFountain (forthcoming).
6not hold, then a Pareto dominating feasible allocation can be found as follows.
If 1￿ s marginal rate of substitution is greater than 2￿ s marginal rate of sub-
stitution plus t, then 1￿ s land parcel can be made slightly larger and 2￿ s land
parcel made slightly smaller, covering the increased commuting cost for 2 and
generating a surplus of numeraire. Of course, an analogous argument can be
made if the inequality is reversed. Given the functional form of utility, the
contract curve features constant land consumption. It is determined by the
equation: 1
s1 = 1
1￿s1 + t,6 where we use the assumption that total endowment





As already discussed, a ￿rst welfare theorem holds in this model, so we
can use the contract curve and s￿ to solve for an equilibrium. A candidate
equilibrium price is given by p(z) = 1
s￿ for 0 ￿ z ￿ s￿, p(z) = 1
s￿ ￿ ￿(z ￿ s￿)
for s￿ ￿ z ￿ 1, where ￿ will be determined by the equal treatment condition.
Consumer 1 pays rent 1






















2(1 ￿ s￿)](1 ￿ s￿) ￿ ts￿. Subtracting,








￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ln(
1
s￿ ￿ 1) (1)
For ￿ = 1￿2s￿
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￿ 1 ￿ ln(
2t
2 + t ￿
p
4 + t2 ￿ 1)
= [
t
2 + t ￿
p









2 + t ￿
p
4 + t2 ￿ 1)]
We claim that this expression is positive for 0 < t < 2. In fact, we prove that
each bracketed expression is positive. To begin, consider the ￿rst bracketed
expression. Notice that 4+t2 ￿ 4+t2+ t4
16, so
p
4 + t2 <
q
4 + t2 + t4
16 ￿ 2+ t2
4 ,
6As discussed in detail in Berliant and Fujita (1992) and Berliant and LaFountain (forth-
coming), the contract curve in the Alonso model can be described in a modi￿ed Edgeworth
box.
7and therefore multiplying both sides by 2+t, (2+t)
p
4 + t2 ￿ 4+2t+ t2
2 + t3
4 .




2 , and thus (2+t)
p
4 + t2 < 4+2t+t2,
or 2t > (2 + t)
p
4 + t2 ￿ 4 ￿ t2. Division of both sides by 2 + t ￿
p
4 + t2
(which is positive as (2+t)2 = 4+t2+4t > 4+t2, 2+t >
p
4 + t2) establishes






2 . The second
bracketed term, t
2 ￿ ln( 2t
2+t￿
p
4+t2 ￿ 1), is also positive as we will prove now.
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4 + t2￿2) > 0, this expression




4 + t2 ￿ 2)][t(
p
4 + t2 ￿ t) + 2(
p
4 + t2 ￿
2)] < 2t(
p
4 + t2 ￿ t). Expanding and collecting terms, this inequality is
4
p
4 + t2 ￿ t2 ￿ 8 < 0, which is true.
For ￿ = 1
s￿; p(1) = 1 and, substituting s￿ = 2+t￿
p
4+t2
2t into equation (1),
u1 ￿u2 = 1
2s￿ ￿ s￿
2 +ts￿ ￿1￿ln( 1













4+t2 ￿1). This expression is negative if t ￿ 0:9231. Then, by the
intermediate value theorem, there is a ￿￿ 2 ( 1￿2s￿
s￿(1￿s￿)2; 1
s￿) such that the utility
levels match. The marginal willingness to pay for land of consumer 2 must
exceed the price: 1
z￿s￿ ￿ 1
s￿ ￿ ￿(z ￿ s￿) or z￿s￿
s￿ ￿ ￿￿(z ￿ s￿)2 ￿ 1. The left
hand side of this inequality is initially 0, that is for z = s￿: The derivative
of the left hand side of the inequality, 1
s￿ ￿ 2￿￿(z ￿ s￿); is nonnegative and
remains nonnegative as long as z < s￿+ 1
2￿￿s￿ which is automatic for z ￿ 1.
Consequently the left hand side of the inequality is maximal for z = 1: It
follows that the marginal willingness to pay for land of consumer 2 exceeds
price if 1￿s￿
s￿ ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ s￿)2 ￿ 1, which is true for ￿￿ ￿ 1￿2s￿
s￿(1￿s￿)2:
In order to verify that this is really an equilibrium, we must show that
composite good consumption is non-negative. We claim that this is true if
8! ￿ 1











































































































Consider the coalition of the government and one consumer, say S = f0;1g:
Then the utility level becomes ln(1) + ! ￿ 1
2Rent ￿ !=2: So the equilibrium
does not belong to the core if !=2 > ln(s￿)+!+ 1
2s￿ ￿1 or ! < 2￿2ln(s￿)￿ 1
s￿:
For t = 0:9231; s￿ = 0:39018 and the upper bound reads ! < 1:319. Since
the upper bound is increasing in s￿, hence decreasing in t, it follows that
1
8 ￿ ! < 1:319 guarantees that for t ￿ 0:9231, the equilibrium allocation does
not belong to the core.
In fact, the core is empty for this example. To see this, suppose that the
core is nonempty. We proved toward the beginning of this section that any
equilibrium allocation is e¢ cient, so this applies to the equilibrium allocation
we have found for our example. Thus, some consumer is as well o⁄ or worse
o⁄ in the core allocation compared with the equilibrium allocation. The
9coalition of this mistreated consumer and the public authority can block the
core allocation using the argument in the preceding paragraph. So we have a
contradiction, and the core is empty.
It is important to note that our example and arguments all apply when
t = 0, that is when there is no commuting cost and the model is aspatial.
Thus, it applies to models with public ownership in general, though we have
not found examples of such models in the literature outside of urban economics.
4 Conclusion
Although land is an indivisible commodity and its use in￿ icts extra commuting
costs on more remotely located consumers, the market does not fail. More-
over, there is no incentive for a subgroup of consumers to form a coalition.
This result holds for private ownership economies with land, possibly featur-
ing an absentee landlord. For an economy with public land ownership where a
government returns rent (at least in excess of its agricultural value) to its cit-
izens, the equilibrium remains basically the same and, in particular, e¢ cient,
but becomes vulnerable to a coalition of the government and a subgroup of
the citizens, even if the rent titles of the excluded citizens are honored. There
is an incentive keep the population small. This idea goes beyond the familiar
notion in the literature on local public goods that wealthy communities use
exclusionary zoning to bar poor residents in order to preserve their tax base.
What is crucial to our argument is that there is an agent endowed with all
of one commodity that pays out rent proceeds from the use of this commodity
to other agents in terms of other goods.
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